For a long time now, I have tried to explain to my readers and listeners that they should not become overly agitated about international treaties as such. Treaties, in and of themselves, say almost nothing about what will actually happen in the real world.
Take, for example, the Czech–American agreement on the temporary presence of foreign troops. If the United States is strong enough and sufficiently determined, it will deploy its forces here regardless of whether any treaty has been signed. Conversely, if we are determined enough—and possess sufficient strength to impose real costs—then we will not allow them in, treaty or no treaty. It is really that simple.
As Professor Krejčí has long observed, international agreements are respected only in those cases and situations where doing so is advantageous. Only in those cases and situations.
If anyone still doubted this, the events of the past few hours should be instructive. The European Commission has run out of funds it intended to send to Ukraine—funds of which a substantial portion would be siphoned off, with a smaller share used to continue a thoroughly pointless war. Having exhausted the available money, the Commission simply seized another large sum instead, in clear violation of what appears to be nearly every EU rule on the books. And does it matter? At this moment, they have sufficient power and audacity. That is enough. Others may complain—but little more.
(Update a few hours later: it appears that, despite ignoring the rules, the Commission may have encountered a technical obstacle in actually seizing the money. So who knows—perhaps nothing will come of it after all.)
The same logic applies to the migration pact. If we are weak, hundreds of thousands of jihadists will be forced upon us, regardless of what the documents say. If we are strong, not a single one will enter—again, regardless of what the documents say.
So what makes a country strong? There are many factors, but one of the decisive ones is the centralization of power. If hundreds of competing power centers operate within a country, and if the European Commission—or any other aggressive external actor—can co-opt some of them, then that country is weak and vulnerable. But if the national government is strong enough to deal firmly with anyone inclined to collaborate with Brussels, Moscow, or any other would-be overlord, then that country is strong.
The centralization of power in the nation-state is not a vice. It is the source of national strength.