Frank Furedi recently published a perceptive essay on the transformation of European politics. The traditional divide between left and right has largely dissolved. In its place stands an aggressive “center” — a bloc that no longer appeals to any coherent ideology, but instead claims legitimacy through supposedly neutral, technocratic governance. This center presents itself as a bulwark against “extremes,” or at least performs that role rhetorically. In practice, anyone who even mildly questions its assumptions is quickly branded an extremist.
At first glance, this description fits the language of today’s European political elites quite well. But pause for a moment.
A genuine political center is, by definition, a position capable of talking to almost everyone. It is a space where compromise is possible, where coalitions can shift between center-left and center-right depending on circumstances, and where broad segments of society remain politically admissible partners. What we are witnessing in Europe is the opposite: a “center” that can barely speak to anyone at all. Its leaders continually expand the list of actors with whom they refuse even to engage, let alone cooperate.
Technocratic governance is supposed to mean a focus on results. It implies pragmatic experimentation, policy correction, and a willingness to abandon failing strategies in favor of what actually works. Yet even by the standards of the goals this political class publicly declares, the outcomes are unimpressive. Climate policies have not meaningfully slowed temperature trends. Escalatory foreign policies have not weakened Russia in any decisive way. And yet the governing class appears largely satisfied. This suggests that achieving concrete outcomes was never the real objective. What passes for “technocracy” today is, in fact, its inversion.
Europe, then, is governed by a center that is not truly centrist, and by technocrats who are not genuinely technocratic. By now, this should surprise no one.